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Abstract 
Whitehead’s cosmology centers on the self-creation of actual occasions that perish 
as they come to be, but somehow do combine to constitute societies that are persistent 
agents and/or patients. “Instance Ontology” developed by D.W. Mertz concerns 
unification of relata into facts of relatedness by specific intensions.  These two 
conceptual systems are similar in that they both avoid the substance-property distinction: 
they differ in their understanding of how basic units combine to constitute complex 
unities. “Process Structural Realism” (PSR) draws from both of these approaches in 
developing an account of how combinations of processes may produce ontologically 
significant coherences. When a group of processes achieves such closure that a set of 
states recurs continually, the effects of that coherence differ from what would occur in 
the absence of that closure. Such altered effectiveness is an attribute of the system as a 
whole, and would have consequences. This indicates that the network of processes, as a 
unit, has ontological significance. The closed network of processes, together with the 
conditions that prevail, constitute the form of definiteness of the coherence. That form 
continues to obtain as long as the coherence persists.  Constituents contribute to, rather 
than share, that characteristic. Aspects of some recent research in systems biology, 
microeconomics, and social psychology illustrate the application of PSR. 
(End of abstract) 
 
 
†  Mailing address: 502 W Broad St #501, Falls Church, VA 22046, USA.   E-mail: 
earleyj@georgetown.edu. 
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Introduction 
This paper briefly reviews how Alfred North Whitehead dealt with what he held to 
be a main problem of philosophy, reports on an alternative outlook called “Instance 
Ontology,” then introduces “Process Structural Realism” (PSR), which draws on both of 
the approaches previously considered to provide an account of how processes may 
combine to yield ontologically significant coherences. Results of some recent research in 
systems biology, microeconomics, and social psychology illustrate application of PSR. 
Whitehead recommended that readers pay careful attention to opening pages of 
scholarly works — for there authors might identify crucial assumptions. However, one 
widely accepted presupposition goes unmentioned, even in prefaces. That is the 
assumption that items that can be affirmed (“predicated”)1 of something else (i.e., 
“properties”) — can cleanly be distinguished from what cannot be predicated (e.g., 
“substances”). Philosophical discussions generally start with presuppositions that specific 
entities (say x) exist and have specific properties (say P) — ( ) (xPx )⋅∃ . Unfortunately, 
once one accepts that substance-property distinction, serious problems are unavoidable. 
Such difficulties surfaced in the recent revival of “structuralist” approaches (French 
2003) in philosophy of science. Those theories — epistemological structural realism, 
ontological structural realism, and (“non-realist”) constructive empiricism — emphasize 
“isomorphism” of structure between theoretical and natural entities, but van Fraassen 
(2006) recalled that, as early as 1920, Reichenbach had objected to that move. “The 
mathematical object of knowledge is uniquely determined by the axioms and definitions 
of mathematics. ….The physical object cannot be determined by axioms and definitions. 
It is a thing of the real world, not an object of the logical world of mathematics.” How 
can a mathematical object (a “universal”) relate to a (nonmathematical) natural entity? 
This problem is not new. John Locke (1690 VI 43) observed: 
                                                 
1   Words used in technical senses will be enclosed in quotation marks on their first use. 
Unless stated otherwise, the sense meant will be that generally used elsewhere in this 
volume. 
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 [T]o… consider man, as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished 
from others in his internal constitution, or real essence, that is, by 
something he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do 
who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things, as 
thought to be made by nature.2 (Emphasis added.) 
Elsewhere in this volume, Rom Harré (forthcoming) holds that this issue is still relevant, 
both for chemistry and for process philosophy.  
The self-identity of things rests on their continuing to possess a modicum 
of `essential’ attributes over time.  However, if `process’ is `continuous 
change’ then how are we to account for self-identity? ….. In the end 
Whitehead’s philosophy leaves us at the very same point as the ontology 
of contemporary chemistry leaves us, with a world sustained by something 
we know not what. 
Towards a Process Ontology 
Whitehead constructed central features of his cosmology with the problematic 
situation sketched out above clearly in mind. “All modern philosophy hinges round the 
difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, 
particular and universal.” (Whitehead [1929] 1978  49) A main feature of the strategy 
Whitehead used to deal with this challenge was rejection of the category of substance, as 
Locke had understood it. “‘Actual entities’ — also termed ‘actual occasions’— are the 
final real things of which the world is made up.” (Whitehead [1929] 1978   18) … 
“Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are.” (Whitehead [1929] 
1978   35). Whiteheadian “actual occasions” are definitely not substances, they do not 
persist; they come to be and, as they do, they perish. “Process” for Whitehead is all of a 
single sort ─ self-creation of actual occasions.  
If (as current science strongly suggests3) we reject the notion of a submicroscopic, 
                                                 
2  The sentence finishes…”if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such 
thing signified by the general names which substances are called by.” 
3  Early interpreters reached a consensus that these fundamental units of Whitehead’s 
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elementary-particle level of description as fundamental, what criterion could identify the 
final real things? Whitehead’s discussion of “concrescence” — the coming to be of each 
actual occasion — suggests a possibility. Each concrescence involves “ingression” of an 
“eternal object” — a “form of definiteness” that serves as a “subjective aim” to regulate 
whether “data” provided by the antecedent world are “prehended” positively (integrated 
into the concresent occasion) or negatively (excluded from the concrescence). A defining 
“eternal object” is a necessary feature of Whiteheadian actual occasions. Another 
important feature of each actual occasion is a contrast of aspects.  
In the analysis of actuality the antithesis between publicity and 
privacy obtrudes itself at every stage. There are elements only to be 
understood by reference to what is beyond the fact in question; and there 
are elements expressive of the immediate, private, personal, individuality 
of the fact in question. The former elements express the publicity of the 
world; the latter elements express the privacy of the individual. 
An actual entity considered with respect to the publicity of things is a 
‘superject’; namely, it arises from the publicity which it finds, and it adds 
itself to the publicity which it transmits. It is a moment of passage from 
decided public facts to a novel public fact. Public facts are, in their nature, 
coordinate. 
 An actual entity considered in reference to the privacy of things is a 
subject; namely, it is a moment in the genesis of self-enjoyment. It 
consists of a purposed self-creation out of materials which are at hand in 
virtue of their publicity. 
                                                                                                                                                 
philosophy of organism were necessarily submicroscopic.  However, the current 
scientific climate is much different from that of the first half of the twentieth century. 
In that period, much chemistry and physics was reductively unified in terms of a few 
sorts of elementary particles (protons, neutrons and electrons). In our own day, 
particles formerly considered elementary are known to be composite, and serious 
arguments are made (Laughlin 2005) that even basic physical laws are ‘emergent’ 
phenomena. 
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Eternal objects have the same dual reference, an eternal object 
considered in reference to the publicity of things is a ‘universal;’ namely, 
in its own nature it refers to the  general public facts of the world without 
any disclosure of the empirical details of its own implication in them. Its 
own nature as an entity requires ingression — positive or negative — in 
every actuality; but its nature does not disclose the private details of any 
actuality. (Whitehead [1929] 1978   289) 
Even though actual occasions perish as they come to be, some combinations of 
actual entities (“societies with personal order”) do have careers through time. In 
Whitehead’s view, all enduring things are societies. “The Universe achieves its values by 
reason of its coordination into societies of societies, and societies of societies of 
societies.” (Whitehead [1933] 1967 206) Societies, not actual occasions, are the bearers 
of what we normally consider to be properties. Process ontology needs to deal with how a 
number of actual occasions can constitute a society that occupies time and interacts with 
the rest of the world in determinate ways — even though the constituent occasions do not 
persist.  
A  Burner Flame as a Society 
Some kind of internal balance characterizes everything that persists. Ordinary 
“material” objects involve equilibration of attraction between components that tends to 
compact the entity, and repulsion that keeps parts separate (Earley forthcoming). At all 
temperatures, every part is in motion. Maintaining balance requires that all such motions 
be oscillatory — that a closed set of states of the composite occur repeatedly. Coherences 
often interact with others to bring about rearrangements of components and thereby to 
produce new types of order. Each such process is the coming-to-be of new coherences 
and the dissolution of old ones. Chemical reactions are especially well understood4 
                                                 
4  If collision between molecules is sufficiently energetic, the collision complex may 
pass through a “transition state” that fragments to yield products other than the 
reactants. In any mixture, a myriad of such “reaction channels” are possible. 
Chemical changes occur through those reaction channels that have transition states of 
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examples of processes, but related interactions are ubiquitous (e.g., in biology, 
psychology, and economics). Normally, processes use up their components and gradually 
slow down. However, some continually get faster ─ because, for instance, they produce 
more of their reactants than they use up. Such “autocatalysis” often leads to explosions. 
However, if an autocatalytic process combines with interactions that can reduce the 
effectiveness of autocatalysis, a balance may be struck and oscillations in the amounts of 
the reactants then will persist over long times. (Earley 2006ab, 2003ab) Every 
“organism” (biological or other) involves many such “homeostatic” arrangements. This 
type of generation of long-lived coherence from several processes is an example of the 
genesis of societal order.  
2
4
O
CH
→
→
 
[ ] heatOHCOstepsrapidseveralOCH ++→→+ 2224 22  
→
→
→
heat
OH
CO
2
2
 
Scheme 1. A minimum set of processes that might be involved in a steady flame. The 
first two lines describe entry of fuel and oxidizer into the reaction zone. The 
last three lines describe the exit of products from the reaction zone5. 
Each steady flame is a persistent coherence of physical processes and chemical 
reactions (e.g., Scheme 1) — this is a “dissipative structure” (Kondepudi, 1998). We can 
consider a stable flame in a burner as a Whiteheadian society. The combustion reaction 
(like most chemical reactions) operates faster at higher temperatures. Since it produces 
heat6 that increases the temperature of the reaction mixture, combustion is autocatalytic 
                                                                                                                                                 
lower energy.  Chemical reactions are complicated but not mysterious. 
5  If either reactant is in excess, or combustion is incomplete, additional lines would 
indicate exit of other system components. 
6  Combustion of methane (the complicated central process in Scheme 1) gives off heat 
because atoms adhere together more strongly in the products than in the reactants. 
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(goes faster as it proceeds). Diffusion of heat out of the system can control that 
autocatalysis (Scott 1994 16-17). Scheme 1 suggests that, in favorable cases, input of 
reactants and exit of products might just balance the combustion reaction, to yield a 
steady flame. So long as fuel and oxidizer enter, and combustion products escape, the 
flame may persist in (more or less) the same shape, and may function (as signal or source 
of heat) in yet other coherences.  Steady flames demonstrate an important type of social 
order. 
Consider Whitehead’s formal definition of a society: 
A nexus enjoys ‘social order’ where (i) there is a common element of form 
illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) 
this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by 
reason of the conditions imposed on it by its prehensions of some other 
members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of 
reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings of that 
common form. Such a nexus is called a ‘society’, and the common form is 
the ‘defining characteristic’ of the society. The notion of ‘defining 
characteristic’ is allied to the Aristotelian notion of ‘substantial form.’ …. 
A nexus enjoys ‘personal order’ when (α) it is a society and (β) when the 
genetic relatedness of its members orders those members ‘serially.’ 
(Whitehead [1929] 1978   34) 
 
Societal Order: Public Aspects  
The “Eleatic Principle” (also known as “Alexander’s Dictum”) specifies:  
…. everything that we postulate to exist should make some sort of 
contribution to the causal/nomic order of the world. (Armstrong 2004  37).  
Merricks (2001) proposed an important clarification of that principle:  
                                                                                                                                                 
The significant chemical potential energy of a methane-oxygen mixture is a 
relational property.  
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… every material object not only has causal powers, but has non-
redundant causal powers. …For material objects to be is to have non-
redundant causal powers.  
This Extended Eleatic Principle (hereafter called the EEP) asserts that each ontologically 
significant entity must exert causal influence that is not reducible to the causal powers of 
the components. Process ontology should clarify the relationship between public and 
private aspects of coherences that have ontological significance. A burner flame has 
effects quite different from an un-ignited stream of oxygenated methane: the flame 
fulfills the EEP. Why does this happen? The steady flame functions as a reliable source 
of heat because the network of chemical and chemical processes has reached an 
appropriate closure, so that a cyclical set of states continually recurs.   
 
Societal Order: Private Aspects 
If a flame is a Whiteheadian society, what would be the component actual 
occasions? Perhaps the dioxygen and methane molecules might be the components of the 
flame. However, an adequate account of that flame would also need to involve the 
structures of the low-energy transition states and the ultimate products. It is not clear that 
there is any “common element of form” shared by all those molecular species. A better 
move might be to consider that the constituents of the flame are the fluxes of molecules 
into and out of the burner, and the chemical reactions that comprise the mechanism of the 
combustion. It is the combination of these dynamic processes that yields the overall 
stability of the flame. If processes (rather than molecules) are constituents of the flame 
then those constituents all contribute, in diverse ways, to the balance that accounts for the 
stability of the flame society. In the achievement of closure of processes that constitutes 
the flame, a form of definiteness — an eternal object — has appeared.7   Successive 
realizations of that closure would be the actual occasions that constitute the society. The  
balance of processes would be a common element of form shared by all those occasions. 
                                                 
7  Elsewhere (Earley 2006b), I proposed that each such closure represent a 
mathematical “group.” 
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All these occasions exemplify the same form of definiteness, as required by Whitehead’s 
definition of a society with personal order.  (To ask where one occasion ends and another 
begins would be “misplaced concreteness” of a high order.) Whitehead’s definition of 
societal organization is an adequate and applicable account of the personal order that 
grounds a society’s persistence through time, but it is not adequate with respect to the 
achievement of satisfaction of each of the society’s constituent successive occasions. 
Each succeeding occasion requires that many agents (each themselves societies with 
personal order) function (each one in a different way) in achieving the coherence of the 
occasion. Those constituent societies contribute to the form of definiteness of the societal 
unity of the concrescent occasion: they do not share that form. 
 
Instance Ontology 
Donald W. Mertz (1996, 1999, 2003, 2004ab, 2005) revived an ancient philosophical 
approach which avoids the substance-property distinction in a way that resembles 
Whitehead’s, but differs significantly. Like Whitehead’s “Philosophy of Organism,” 
Mertz’s “Instance Ontology” operates with a single ontological category. Whitehead calls 
his final real things actual entities or actual occasions: Mertz uses alternative 
designations — “property instance,” “state of affairs,” “fact of relationship”— for his 
basic ontological category.  Each such property-instance corresponds to a formula.  
:Rni (a1, a2, … , an) 
The leading colon distinguishes a fact (a state of affairs) from a corresponding 
“proposition,” Rni (a1, a2, … , an) — a statement that the fact exists. Superscript n pertains 
to the number (1 ≤ n) of “relata” which the fact involves. When n = 1, the relation is 
“monadic” rather than “polyadic,” and corresponds to a “property”. 8  Relata are 
                                                 
8  Mertz denies that relationships derive from the (monadic) properties of individual 
relata. Concerning professional basketball players, some say that Yao Ming is taller 
than Shaquille O’Neal because Yao is seven feet five inches (2.26 meters) tall while 
Shaq stands only seven feet one inch (2.16 meters). From an Instance Ontology 
perspective, what counts is that Yao’s height is greater than Shaq’s height.  
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individuals — property instances, “intensions,” or “complexes.” The list (a1, a2,… , an) 
specifies the relata for a particular instance designated by a subscript (i in this case). The 
order of relata is important: “Mary loves John” is not the same state of affairs as “John 
loves Mary.”  Rni is the “intension” of the relationship (what connects the n relata in a 
particular fact). Closely related intensions (Rnj, Rnk, Rnl, …) may occur in similar property 
instances involving other relata. The various intensions Rni, Rnj, Rnk, Rnl, … may all be 
exemplifications of a “relation-type,” R.n Relation-types correspond to “universals,” and 
to Whitehead’s “eternal objects.”  Only one intension Rni of the type Rn involves a 
particular list of relata (a1, a2, …, an). Each property instance, like each Whiteheadian 
actual entity, is unique and unrepeatable. Each property instance is “continuously simple” 
in the sense that analysis of that relation instance into intension and relata is “conceptual” 
rather than having ontological implications (Mertz 2004a). What exists is each particular 
fact of relationship.  If we trip over something heavy, rectangular, and red, we may 
identify it as “a red brick,” but that linguistically convenient separation into substance 
and property is (in Mertz’s view) a mental distinction, not an ontological one. In a heap 
of bricks, there is indeed a sharing of universals (heavy, rectangular, made of clay, red) 
but those are shared between red-brick-instances, rather than between red brick-
substances. By recognition of intension-types (universals), Mertz’s approach qualifies as 
a realism9.  
Each state of affairs corresponds to unification of its relata. 
 [E]ach relation, insofar as it obtains among an n-tuple of relata (i.e., is an 
ontic (material) predicate), is a cause of unity of itself with and among 
each of its n subjects, where this unity is conditioned or delimited by a 
specific n-adic content of intension, Rn  … and by its compatibility with 
each of the n subjects. (Mertz 2003 130) 
The ontology of property instances provides a way of dealing with compound individuals 
                                                 
9  Instance Ontology is a type of “particularism.” “Trope theory” (Trettin 2004) is a 
“nominalist”   particularism that does not recognize universals. 
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that are produced by complementary activities of diverse individuals. 
The unity in a fact is a plural one — the relata are both connected via an 
instance of Rn and yet by the same agency held in an identity-saving 
distinctness from each other and the relation. (Mertz 2003 130). 
This makes the relata (a1, a2, … , an) — together with the intension — into a unified 
whole rather than a mere list, set, or  mereological fusion. Relation instances may be 
relata in other relation instances. Such “horizontal” composition yields complexes.  
Similarly, complexes (as unified wholes) can serve as relata in “vertical” types of 
composition.   
Mertz specifically denies a widely held principle: 
The Unity-by-the-Unit Thesis, U. All elements making up a plural whole 
must share a single unifier as the constituent cause of their collective unity 
and hence of the existence of the resultant whole. (Mertz 2003 132) 
As Mertz points out, a steel chain may be an effective unity even though each link 
connects only to at most two other links. So long as every link holds to its neighbors, the 
chain does not need a cable threaded through all the links in order to achieve integrity. A 
chain of many links has no unifying agent other than the links themselves. There is no 
need for “something, one knows not what.” In virtue of achieved integrity, sturdy chains 
may be working parts of larger plural unities. Gilbert Simondon ([1964] 1992 300) 
pointed out that philosophers generally take constituted individuals as given. He 
recommends that we should try to: “… understand the individual from the process of 
individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual.” 
Anticipating this point, Whitehead makes the achievement of individuality by each actual 
occasion a focus of his system. Mertz does not appear to have dealt with the process of 
individuation yet.  
Process Structural Realism (PSR) 
Whitehead’s definition of a society requires that all constituent occasions share an 
element of form. This seems to be statement of what Mertz called The Unity-by-the-Unit 
Thesis U. This principle would lead to the awkward interpretation that the constituent 
occasions of a flame society must be successive realizations of the network of 
relationships that defines the flame. It seems better to use an alternative interpretation, 
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that a society (such as a flame) is a plural unity in which diverse components (molecules, 
fluxes, etc.) contribute to (rather than share) a defining characteristic10 of the society. A 
specific closure of n agents, :Cni say (a determinate instance of the relation-type 
“closure,” Cn) would unify constituent processes (including fluxes from and to the 
outside world) and thereby ground the external relations of the coherence, as well as 
individuate that coherence as the occasion that it is. Successor11 members of the same 
society :Cnj, :Cnk, :Cnl … would inherit from predecessors the same non-mysterious 
intension-type Cn. Perhaps this is the ‘something we know not what’ sought by Locke, 
and by Harré.  
That is to say, when a group of processes achieves such closure that a set of states of 
affairs recurs continually, the effect of that coherence on the world differs from what 
would occur in the absence of that closure. (Earley 2003c, also the Appendix of this 
paper). Such altered effectiveness is an attribute of the system as a whole, and would 
have consequences. This indicates that the network of processes, as a unit, fulfills the 
EEP, and therefore has ontological significance. Whenever a network of processes 
generates continual return to a limited set of states of affairs, the system may function as 
a “whole”— with respect to appropriate interaction partners. The balance achieved by the 
processes provides the form of definiteness of a unified agent. The causal powers of such 
coherent aggregates are indeed just the powers of the “constituents acting in concert” 
(Merricks 2001). However, the components act in concert in the specific way they do 
only because of their inclusion in the closed set of interactions that defines the coherence. 
This renders the causal powers of the coherence defined by that closure non-redundant, 
and hence the coherence, as a unit, is ontologically significant. The form of definiteness 
                                                 
10  On this basis, the flame society would a fact of relatedness, involving as relata the 
concentrations of reactants and products, and rate parameters for each of the relevant 
processes (e.g., those in Scheme 1). Rate parameters for each process implicitly 
include information on transition states and forcing functions for that process. 
11  To hold that each member occasion of a persistent society exists only at an instant (a 
temporal point) is the error of “simple location.” (Whitehead [1925] 1967) 
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that provides internal coherence (a private aspect) also grounds external efficacy (a public 
aspect) of the societal aggregation. The closure is a structural feature of the coherence — 
possibly, but not necessarily, apparent in spatial structuring. One can show12 that every 
such coherence is the representation of a mathematical “group” or “semi-group.” What is 
fundamental is achievement of effective coherence — the level of size on which that 
achievement occurs is irrelevant. Combinations of processes produce effects that are not 
simply attributable to the constituents. Whenever that efficacy is relevant,13 non-
redundant causality warrants recognition of those coherences as ontologically significant. 
This ontology is a variety of structural realism — related to Ontological Structural 
Realism (OSR) (French 2003). It is also a kind of process philosophy. The designation 
“Process Structural Realism” (PSR) seems appropriate.   How would this approach work 
out in practice? We consider four system-types, two from biology and two from the 
social sciences. 
 
Partial Networks of Biochemical Reactions as “Oscillophores” 
There has been a recent increase in interest in ‘systems biology’ ─ quantitative 
modeling of complex networks of biological interactions. Complicated systems of 
interactions abound at all biological levels — molecular, organismic, and ecological. Sets 
of interactions that return repeatedly to the same sequence of states (a closed “trajectory” 
in appropriate “state space”) are of special interest. Oscillating interaction networks have 
been studied extensively in non-biological contexts (e.g., Eiswirth 1991)14 but constraints 
peculiar to biological systems require special attention. Typically, networks of interaction 
that are of biological interest involve tens or hundreds of interacting species and 
                                                 
12   This involves Cayley’s theorem. (Earley 2006b) 
13  Whether or not coherence is ontologically significant depends on the detailed 
characteristics of entities with which that coherence interacts (Earley 2003c). 
14  Such studies consider “direct” autocatalysis in which a single reaction produces tow 
or three copies of one of the reactants.  In biological systems, “indirect” or 
“network” autocatalysis (e.g., Scheme 2) predominates. 
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correspondingly large numbers of interactions. Fortunately, much can be learned 
(Goldstein 2004) by studying “sub-networks”— structural motifs that occur as parts of 
larger networks. Some specific patterns of connection (“topologies”) internal to partial 
networks can lead to sustained oscillations when they are included in larger sets of 
interactions in biological systems.  When imbedded in larger systems, some sub-networks 
are carriers of oscillatory behavior (“oscillophores”).  Scheme 2 represents three reactions 
(dark circles) involving only three biochemical (molecular) agents (open circles). In the 
first reaction, species X produces Y, but with concomitant reformation of X. In the 
second and third reactions, species Z removes X and Y from the system.15 For 
appropriate parameters, this partial network (as a unit) can display autocatalysis, and 
thereby “destabilize” a larger network of which it is a part.  Such instability is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for oscillation. 
 
1)    X    →     ½ (X + Y) 
 
2)    X + Z   → 
 
3)     Y + Z   → 
 
 
Scheme 2. Two representations of a oscillophore of minimum size. Open 
circles corespond to molecular species, filled circles corespond 
to processes, including exit from the system 
                                                 
15  A product inhibition pathway in certain (phosphofructokinase) enzymatic  reactions 
fits this pattern. 
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Circadian Rhythms 
Many biological organisms display cyclical variations in characteristics (e.g., body 
temperature) with a period of approximately twenty-four hours. These “circadian” 
rhythms are one of the most studied aspects of systems biology. Remarkably, circadian 
oscillations maintain approximately 24-hour periods under wide variations in external 
conditions and gross changes in the internal states of the animals displaying them. 
Clearly, mechanisms underlying these oscillatory changes must be insensitive to 
variations in parameters. This characteristic is called “robustness.” Robustness would be 
an evolutionary advantage, by allowing organisms to function well in changing 
circumstances. However, it is not clear how this feature might have originated through 
biological evolution. One suggestive observation is that circadian rhythms typically result 
from complex combinations of several different oscillatory networks, rather than from 
single oscillatory mechanisms, such as the relatively simple ones studied by physical 
chemists, or the minimum oscillophores just considered.  Perhaps there is some 
connection between evolutionarily valuable robustness and mechanistic complexity. 
To understand the evolutionary origin of robustness of circadian rhythms, Andreas 
Wagner (2005) considered a simple mechanism that is relevant for some circadian 
oscillations. In this model, a nucleic acid (mRNA, designated R) serves as a template for 
production of a protein (P) that (after a delay) produces a second protein (P′). The second 
protein interacts with the nucleic acid in a way that decreases the rate of production of P. 
(This is “product inhibition”.) The investigator considered all possible interactions of two 
distinct but similar oscillators of this class. The three components of the first oscillator 
are R1, P1 and P1′. The second oscillator involves corresponding substances, R2, P2, and 
P2′. Wagner restricted his attention to the interaction of P1′ with R1, R2 and P2′, and the 
corresponding interactions of P2′. Each of these six interactions was allowed one of three 
characteristics ─ inhibitory, catalytic, or absent (decreasing, increasing, or having no 
influence on, the overall reaction rate). Those (36) combinations of possibilities give rise 
to 729 interaction topologies. The detailed behavior of each topology depends on a 
number of parameters (between 10 and 16, depending on the topology).  Only 201 of 
those topologies gave rise to circadian oscillations for at least one set of the values of 
relevant parameters. (5000 random combinations were tested). The majority of topologies 
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that yielded circadian oscillation did so for only a small number of parameter sets — that 
is, those topologies were not robust. In contrast, about 5% of the 729 topologies yielded 
oscillations for many sets of parameter values, demonstrating significant robustness. The 
topology in which both systems (1 and 2) oscillate independently was one order of 
magnitude less robust than the most robust 5% of the coupled topologies. Since more 
robust topologies would have an evolutionary advantage, significant increase in 
robustness provided by coupling of oscillatory mechanisms is a sufficient explanation of 
persistence of mechanistic complexity that natural circadian rhythms display. In the 
system modeled, more robust topologies resembled each other closely; paths involving 
only single alterations in topology connected them all. This indicates that ordinary 
evolutionary development could reach all robust topologies. There is no evidence that the 
origin of complicated mechanisms (and therefore robust topologies) would present an 
evolutionary problem. 
 
Complex Coherence 
Psychiatrist Murray Bowen (Bowen 1991, Kerr 1989) held that people begin life as 
reactive components of “family systems:” “differentiation” toward formation of an 
autonomous “self” may occur during maturation of an individual, but is often inadequate, 
and is never fully achieved. Deficiencies in differentiation lead to individual and family 
pathologies. In social psychology, Rom Harré (2003) developed “positioning theory” 
which holds that agents develop in and through “conversation” with others. 
… discursive practices constitute the speakers and hearers and yet at the 
same time in certain ways is a resource through which speakers and 
hearers can negotiate new positions. A subject position is a possibility in 
new forms of talk: position is what is created in and through talk as the 
speakers and hearers take themselves up as persons. …(Davies 1991) 
Partial integrations of processes that involve scarce resources are major features of 
the modern world. These large-scale economic systems provide the basis for survival of 
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over 6.5 billion humans (3/1/2006 estimate). Standard economics16 assumes that 
individuals choose among courses of action, based on accurate information and because 
of preferences (“utility” functions) that are self-interested and predetermined. That is to 
say, the agents recognized by standard economics are pre-constituted and pre-
individuated — the  assumption applies. Social interactions are all 
“contractual.” This is the model of “economic man.” This approach has clarified 
important aspects of economic behavior, but has deficiencies (e.g. Drucker 1939) that are 
now widely recognized (Brooks 2006). A new approach to microeconomics (Bowles 
2003) treats utility functions as developed over time, under the influence of non-
contractual social arrangements (“institutions”) and controlled by intrinsic limitations on 
individual reasoning power (“bounded” rationality) and scarcity of relevant information. 
This amounts to considering that economic agents emerge from the interactions in which 
those agents engage, as Bowen, Harré and others describe. Camerer (2006) reviewed 
recent experiments (most used “game theory”) testing the applicability of the standard 
economic model. The main findings were that some situations provide agents with 
incentives to do the opposite of what other agents are doing. (This is strategic 
“substitutability”). In such cases, the model of economic man applies reasonably well. In 
other situations, incentives favor agents matching strategies employed by others— then 
the economic man model does not apply. In the latter case (called strategic 
“complementarity”), highly coordinated action of agents can arise from factors not 
considered important in standard economics.  The cases in which the model of economic 
man does not apply are similar to the biochemical oscillophores in that autocatalytic
( ) (xPx ⋅∃ )
                                                
17 
processes can destabilize systems, possibly — but by no means necessarily — leading to 
yet higher levels of integration if suitable controls emerge. Each of these diverse 
examples illustrate how ontologically significant coherence can arise from process. 
 
 
16   Neoclassical or ‘Walrasian’ economics 
17  Indirect (network) autocatalysis can obtain even when the model of economic man is 
applicable. 
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Applications of PSR 
At the end of the paper that questioned how mathematical objects might apply to 
things of the natural world, van Frassen (2006) pointed out that every investigation has 
some particular interest. Every investigator (scientist or not) has a specific point of view 
– and  that effectively reduces the intrinsic complexity of the natural world and enables 
observations (necessarily partial) to constitute a “data model.” Such models are 
mathematical objects rather than natural ones. Judgments of isomorphism between 
theoretical models and data models are appropriate. 
Whitehead was sensitive to the inherent complexity of nature. 
However we fix a determinate entity, there is always a narrower 
determination of something which is presupposed in our first choice. Also 
there is always a wider determination into which our first choice fades by 
transition beyond itself. The general aspect of nature is that of 
evolutionary expansiveness.  (Whitehead [1925] 1967 93) 
This short survey identified four levels of dynamic structure: biochemical oscillophores, 
robust circadian rhythms in individual organisms, human selves emerging through 
conversation, and economic integrations. Many levels of integration intervene between 
the pair from systems biology and the set of two from social science. Similarly, there are 
many levels of structure at lower18 (and higher) levels of complexity. However, at each 
of the four levels considered —and, I propose, at all of the other levels as well — closure 
of networks of processes provides good warrant for recognition of individual coherences 
with non-redundant causality as items of ontological significance. Individuals on any one 
level are composed of individuals of lower levels. Those lower-level individuals 
contribute in diverse ways to the realization of the closure of relationships that defines 
and individuates the more-complex coherence. It is not clear that the form of definiteness 
of the more complex individual is a component of those lower level entities. Composite 
coherences at any level contribute (both directly and through intermediate complexes) to 
coherences at higher levels of complexity. Higher levels of complexity control 
                                                 
18  Chemists leave the less complex  levels to physicists. (Laughlin 2005)  
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environments in which lower level coherences must continually renew themselves. 
Failure of closure at any level sometimes occurs, with consequences both up and down 
the scale of complexity. (Please see the Appendix.) 
The endurance of an entity represents the attainment of a limited aesthetic 
success, though if we look beyond it to its external effects, it may 
represent an aesthetic failure. Even within itself, it may represent the 
conflict between a lower success and a higher failure. The conflict is the 
presage of disruption. (Whitehead [1925] 1967 94) 
Process Structural Realism, as a structuralism, emphasizes19  the central importance of 
self-restoring networks of relationships (structures). As realism, it recognizes universals 
as necessary constituents of states of affairs. As process philosophy, it holds that closure 
of networks of processes defines individuals — and processes are all self-creation of 
individual dynamic coherences. 
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19  PSR is open to the possibility that there may be closed cycles of relationships 
without other non-relational relata (French 2003, Mertz 2003 154-157), but does not 
require that to be the case.  
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Appendix  
Suppose we have a set of several agents (x1, x2 , x3 , …. xi) — let's call them “X, the 
set of xs”.  Each x may interact with other xs, and with itself. Also, consider an 
appropriate test agent y that has some property F when the xs do not interact in a 
significant way. If the xs do interact so as to generate a closed set of states that 
continually recur over a more or less extended period of time – indicated X I, then y may 
have different (other than F) properties (~F) due to interaction between y and X, the set of 
xs . If the latter condition prevails, it is legitimate to conclude that an emergent entity z 
exists, and the xs  are parts of z. 
If P is the part relation, I indicates that the set of xs  interact to yield closed set of 
states, and y is an agent that, in the absence of significant interaction among the xs , has 
property F then: 
The symbol itimate to 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ){ }1 . . . . ~ix x X X I y F y⎡ ⎤∃ ∃ ∈ ⊃ ∃⎣ ⎦
{
  
 z refers to an emergent entity of which the xs  are parts. It is leg
speak of the emergence of a new entity z, if and only if certain agents (the xs  in this case) 
interact in such a way that some (any) test entity (y) suffers a change in its properties (F 
becomes ~F) due to the closure of that interaction (XI) .  If such closure does occur, then 
the xs  are correctly considered as parts of the emergent entity z — that is,  XPz.  Any 
such z might interact with other agents, of similar or different sorts, to generate yet larger 
emergent entities, say, one of the ws . Also, each and every one of the xs , is itself an 
emergent entity made up of components, perhaps the us . Every one of these integrations 
can fail to persist, with consequences both for its constituents and for coherences of 
which it may be a component. 
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